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THE TRUSTEE IN BANiillUPTCY AS A 
SECURED CREDITOR UNDER THE 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
Frank R. Kennedy* 
S UPPOSE A and B both have security interests in property of their common debtor D; A's rights are superior to B's; and Dis bank-
rupt: 
(I) If neither A's security intereilt nor that of B can be 
avoided on a direct attack by the trustee under the Bankruptcy 
Act, should A's priority over B outside of bankruptcy enable the 
trustee to defeat B's security interest in bankruptcy? 
(2) If A's security interest can be avoided by the trustee but 
B's cannot, can the trustee by asserting A's rights against B avoid 
B's rights without regard to the amount of A's secured debt or 
the value of the collateral? 
A negative answer to both questions has always seemed to me to 
be the only one compatible with the underlying assumptions of the 
Bankruptcy Act and one that accords a fair respect to the rights of 
secured creditors. From time to time, however, there have appeared 
in print suggestions that an affirmative answer can be given.1 In par-
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1935, Southwest Missouri State Col-
lege; LL.B. 1939, Washington University; J.S.D. 1953, Yale University.-Ed. 
I wish to acknowledge the assistance given me by Mr. A. Rodriguez Bautista, LL.B., 
University of the Philippines; LL.M., University of Michigan; and now a third-year 
student in the University of Michigan School of Law, in the preparation of this article. 
A special acknowledgment to the late Professor James A. MacLachlan is also ap-
propriate here. As is pointed out in the text accompanying note 24 infra, this article 
is essentially an elaboration of a position he had taken and supported in his treatise 
on Bankruptcy in 1956. I had intended to show him my manuscript before its publica-
tion in this symposium so that it might have the benefit of his critical examination. 
A tragic accident on April 17, 1967, took his life and prevented my submission of the 
paper for his scrutiny and suggestions. I am nevertheless deeply indebted to him for 
the contributions he unknowingly made to this study. 
1. See, e.g., COUNTRYMAN, CASES ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 453, 489 (1964); Coleman, 
The Uniform Commercial Code Applied in Bankruptcy: A Few Important Problems, 
19 ALA. L. REv. 59, 62 (1966); Comment, 39 TEX. L. REv. 616, 620-21 (1961). 
Professor Countryman, in a note following Lewis v. Manufacturers Nat'l Bank, 364 
U.S. 603 (1961), states: 
[W]here the only consequence of delay in filing is to invalidate a chattel mortgage 
as to creditors who acquire a lien before filing, and the mortgage is filed before 
bankruptcy, § 70c will not avail the trustee-and neither will § 70e unless an actual 
creditor with a provable claim acquired a lien before filing. In re Consorto Con-
struction Co., 212 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 833 (1954). 
Actually a United States tax lien and a Pennsylvania lien for unpaid corporation taxes 
were perfected during the interim between execution and recording of the chattel mort-
gage under attack in Consorto. 212 F.2d at 677. Professor Countryman cites cases hold-
ing tax claims to be provable at pp. 506 and 672-73 of his casebook. The possibility 
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ticular it has been argued that a trustee may avoid utterly any per-
fected security interest that is subordinated by the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (Code) to the lien of any creditor with a provable 
claim.2 
This argument rests on three propositions that are in themselves 
sound enough: 
(I) The trustee is entitled to assert the right of any actual 
creditor with a provable claim to avoid a security interest ( or any 
other transfer) under section 70.e of the act. 
(2) The fact that a creditor is secured does not make his 
claim nonprovable. 
(3) Under the doctrine of Moore v. Bay,3 the right of the 
trustee to avoid a transfer under section 70e is not limited by 
the amount of the claim of the creditor whose right of avoidance 
is being enforced. 
The thesis of this article is that a trustee cannot exploit the ad-
vantage of the lien or security of any creditor unless he can avoid it 
and displace a creditor. Moreover, when he can and does avoid a lien 
and displace a creditor, he can enforce the rights of that creditor as 
against any lien or interest otherwise indefeasible in bankruptcy 
only to the extent of the lien or security of the creditor he displaces. 
I. THE DoCTRINE OF Moore v. Bay 
Section 70e of the Bankruptcy Act reads in pertinent part as fol-
lows: 
A transfer made or suffered ... by a debtor adjudged a bank-
that the trustee could have utilized the, priority of the tax lienors to defeat the chattel 
mortgage was nevertheless not adverted to in Consorto. 
Although the commentator in the Texas Law Review could find no cases to support 
his suggestion, he thought it "reasonably clear" that the trustee could avoid a federal 
tax lien otherwise indefeasible under § 70e if a creditor with a provable claim was also 
a judgment creditor, mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser protected by § 6323 of the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 1954. This reasoning would afford the trustee an effective 
remedy whenever he can find a creditor with a provable claim who is one of the many 
varieties of persons protected by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. 80 Stat. 1125 (1966), 
26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 (Supp. 1967). The commentator does not say whether the judgment 
creditor, mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser would be displaced when the trustee asserts 
his rights in bankruptcy or whether the trustee can effectively assert the rights of the 
protected person only when there is a surplus. 
2. Professor Riesenfeld has recently put the matter as follows: 
A contract creditor who succeeds in squeezing in an attachment lien under section 
9-301(l)(b) or (2) will supply the trustee with Moore v. Bay powers. Although the 
creditor is secured and his claim is not allowable, it is a provable claim as required 
by section 70(e) of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Riesenfeld, Book Review, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1854, 1857 (1966); accord, 4 CoLLIER, BANK• 
RUPTCY ,r 70.62, at 1494.23 n.86 &: 1494.24 (14th ed. rev. 1964) [hereinafter cited as COL-
LIER]; 2 HAWKLAND, A TRANsAcnONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COJ\tMERCIAL CODE 683, 
695 (1964). 
3. 284 U.S. 4 (1931). 
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rupt under this Act which, under any Federal or State law applicable 
thereto, is . . . voidable for any . . . reason by any creditor of the 
debtor, having a claim provable under this Act, shall be null and 
void as against the trustee of such debtor. 
Afoore v. Bay4 involved an avoidance by a trustee of a belatedly 
recorded chattel mortgage which was voidable under California law 
only by creditors who extended credit before the recordation. The 
lower courts had given the mortgage priority over creditors who ex-
tended credit after recordation. In a cryptic opinion reversing the 
decree below, Mr. Justice Holmes said: 
The trustee in bankruptcy gets the title to all property which has 
been transferred by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors or which prior 
to the petition he could by any means have transferred, or which 
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against 
him. Act of July I, 1898, c. 541, sec. 70. By section 67a claims which 
for want of record or for other reasons would not have been valid 
liens as against the claims of the creditors of the bankrupt shall not 
be liens against his estate. The rights of the trustee by subrogation 
are to be enforced for the benefit of the estate.5 
The above quotation was all the Court said about the trustee's 
right to avoid the chattel mortgage in the case. The first sentence is 
an oversimplified summary of section 70a of the act. The last sentence 
quoted is a restatement of the substance of former section 67b. A 
single sentence was added at the end of the two-paragraph opinion to 
deal with the distribution of "what thus is recovered for the benefit 
of the estate." No question has ever been raised as to the correctness 
of the disposition of this latter issue. However, critics of the decision 
who believe that the Court failed to realize that this was not the only 
issue are afforded considerable support by the opinion itself. 6 
In any event, the case now stands for the proposition that if the 
trustee can find one qualified creditor in a position to avoid a transfer 
of the bankrupt's property, the trustee's right is not limited by the 
amount of that creditor's claim.7 Insofar as section 70e endows the 
trustee with the standing of a subrogee, the foregoing statement of 
the doctrine of Moore v. Bay contravenes a fundamental attribute of 
subrogation-that the person subrogated acquires no greater rights 
than those of the person to whose position he is subrogated.8 That 
4. Ibid. 
5. Moore v. Bay, 284 U.S. 4, 5 (1931). 
6. See l\fAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 331 (1956) (hereinafter cited as MACLACHLAN]; 
Scott, The Meaning of the Provisions for Recordation of a Transfer as Applicable to 
Preference Under the Bankruptcy Act and a Critique of the Decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in the Case of Moore v. Bay, 18 VA. L. REv. 249,266 (1932). 
7. 4 CoUJER ,r 70.95 (1959). 
8. Scott, supra note 6, at 267. 
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indeed is one of the unanswerable criticisms that can be made of the 
doctrine, but Moore v. Bay has survived well laid attacks on its il-
logicality as well as its inequity,9 and this paper is not intended to 
renew them. The argument here is a more modest one, namely, that 
the anomalous doctrine should not be extended. It is extremely awk-
ward to argue that an illogical rule ought to be circumscribed by 
considerations of a logical character, but that is the view that this 
article will seek to sustain. 
In attempting to understand the operation of section 70e, students 
are often confused by statements which indicate that, although a 
general creditor may attack a belatedly perfected security interest, 
he must first obtain a lien through judicial proceedings. Such state-
ments are frequently encountered in discussions of the pre-Code law 
of California, Michigan, New York, and other states where creditors 
extending credit before perfection of a security interest coµld never-
theless levy on the property after perfection.10 It was in such states 
9. The doctrine has not lacked defenders. See, e.g., 2 GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEY-
ANCES AND PREFERENCES 866-67 (rev. ed. 1940); Schwartz, Moore v. Bay-Should Its Rule 
Be Abolished?, 29 REF. J. 67 (1955); Comment, 17 .ARK. L. R.Ev. 46, 56 (1962); 45 YALE 
L.J. 504, 506 (1936). The doctrine relieves the trustee of the burden of justifying 
the full measure of relief sought under § 70e by proving the identity of all the creditors 
who could have avoided a transfer but for bankruptcy and proving the amounts of their 
claims. Moreover, the doctrine has implemented the bankruptcy policy of hostility to 
secret liens. 
The commentator in the Arkansas Law Review, cited supra, adds that if the creditor 
to whose position the trustee is subrogated under § 70e gets only a pro rata share of 
the recovery, "this creditor would justifiably feel shortchanged if a pro tanto recovery 
in his favor was then distributed among all claimants, leaving him with only a fraction 
of what he would have recovered had it not been for the intervention of bankruptcy." 
17 ARK. L. REv. at 56. The fact of the matter is that, irrespective of the amount of the 
trustee's recovery under § 70e, any general creditor is not likely to receive a substantial 
distribution in bankruptcy. All claims entitled to priority under § 64 must be paid in 
full before anything is available for creditors without priority, and all the general 
creditors are then required to share pro rata in the balance, if any. In any event the 
disappointed expectations of the creditor who furnished the trustee his right of avoid-
ance are not a rational justification for enlarging the trustee's right of recovery at the 
expense of the transferee for the benefit of persons not falling within the ambit of pro-
tection of the nonbankruptcy law invoked by the trustee under § 70e. 
10. See, e.g., Noyes v • .Bank of Italy, 206 Cal. 266, 269-70, 274 Pac. 68, 70 (1929); 
Ransom & Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 31, 37, 261 N.W. 128, 130 (1935); .Button 
v. Rathbone, Sard &: Co., 126 N.Y. 187, 191, 27 N.E. 266, 267 (1891). 
Such statements involved no contradiction or confusion in purpose. As the Supreme 
Court of Michigan explained in Dempsey v. Pforzheimer, 86 Mich. 652, 656, 49 N.W. 
465, 466-67 (1891): 
The gist of the reason is that the creditor has no business with the debtor's 
property until he has obtained possession of it by some legal process that gives him 
a lien upon it .•.• [S]uch creditors [of the mortgagor] have no right to touch the 
debtor's property without his consent, without legal process • . • • , 
Professor Marsh has suggested that the California court in Noyes seemed to have 
"adopted a wholly untenable construction of section 70c of the Bankruptcy Act, i.e., 
that the trustee could claim to be a creditor who acquired a lien as of some date prior 
to bankruptcy." Marsh, Constance v. Harvey-The "Strong-Arm Clause" Re-Evaluated, 
43 CALIF. L. REv. 65, 69 n.20 (1955). On the contrary, the court explicitly recognized 
"that the trustee acquired a lien status as of the time when the petition in bankruptcy 
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that Moore v. Bay had its principal utility for the trustee. As Professor 
Gilmore explains: 
[W]e assumed Justice Holmes would have said in Moore v. Bay if 
he had dotted his i's and crossed his t's: § 70(c) merely supplements 
§ 70(e) by conferring lien status on the trustee in his representation 
of existing or actual creditors if applicable state law provides that 
only lien creditors can avoid the challenged transaction.11 
This is not to say, however, that the trustee must show that he rep-
resents an existing or actual creditor in order to avoid an unperfected 
security interest under the Code. When the applicable state law in-
validates or subordinates a security interest at the instance of a 
creditor who obtains a lien by judicial proceedings without regard to 
the date or other circumstances attending the extension of credit, 
the trustee prevails under section 70c without more.12 
As an original matter, there is much to be said for the rule that 
permitted any creditor who extended credit during a period of delay 
in the perfection of a security interest in the debtor's property to pre-
vail over that interest notwithstanding the fact that perfection pre-
ceded the creditor's levy.13 It ran a good idea into the ground, how-
ever, to invalidate a security interest in toto for the benefit of all the 
unsecured creditors because of a delay which was presumptively prej-
was filed." Noyes v. Bank of Italy, supra at 269-70, 274 Pac. at 70. The trustee repre-
sented actual creditors whose claims arose before the belated perfection of the mortgage. 
II. 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 1295 (1965) [hereinafter 
cited as GILMORE]. Professor Riesenfeld submitted a proposal to the National Bank-
ruptcy Conference in 1956 which would have in substance codified the view of the 
trustee's status under § 70c and e presented in the text. 1956 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY 
CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL MEETING 68. The Conference approved 
the proposal in principle. Id. at 14. The proposal was not presented to Congress for 
enactment, presumably because legislation was not thought to be necessary to establish 
the rule. 
12. See 4 COLLIER 1f 70.51, at 1429 (1959). The Pre-Code law of Washington construed 
in Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Edwards, 304 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1962), allowed only subsequent 
creditors to take advantage of a delay in the perfection of a conditional sale, and the 
court rejected an attack on a belatedly filed conditional sale of an automobile to the 
bankrupt because the trustee could find no actual creditor who had extended credit to 
the bankrupt after the sale. This kind of problem is avoided by Article Nine of the 
Code in that a lien creditor is protected against an unperfected security interest with-
out regard to the date of extension of the credit by the lien creditor. See U.C.C. §§ 
9-30I(l)(b), 9-313(4)(b) 8: 9-314(3)(b). 
13. Any perfection requirement that assures some form of notice to creditors would 
seem best to serve its purpose if compliance occurs before the creditor changes his posi-
tion by extending credit. See Project, California Chattel Security and Article Nine of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 8 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 806, 899 (1961). This was the premise 
of the pre-Code Michigan law. See, e.g., Ransom 8: Randolph Co. v. Moore, 272 Mich. 
31, 261 N.W. 128 (1935), 14 MICH. ST. B.J. 422 (1935). The case for protecting a creditor 
who acquired his claim before the execution of the security interest against delay in its 
perfection was certainly less cogent. The classic explanation was that such a creditor 
might be lulled into forbearing to enforce collection by the appearance of unencum-
bered ownership during the delay in perfection. Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316, 32 N.E. 
1073 (1893). 
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udicial to no more than one or a very few creditors. The risks and 
attendant inconveniences generated by Moore v. Bay could hardly 
have been overlooked during the formulation of the policy and lan-
guage of section 9-301 of the Code, which lists the persons who take 
priority over unperfected security interests.14 In any event, the Code's 
adoption of the lien creditor test in section 9-301 was a deliberate 
rejection of the rule of state law that underlay the ruling of that 
notorious case. 
I!. SUBROGATION OF THE TRUSTEE TO THE RIGHTS OF A 
CREDITOR HOLDING A VALID LIEN 
As acknowledged at the ~utset of the article, the claim of a credi-
tor is provable notwithstanding the fact that it is secured.15 If one 
argues from this premise, however, that the trustee may avoid any 
interest which is inferior to that of any secured creditor with a prov-
able claim, the suggestion is startling in its implications. The reper-
cussions from Benedict v. Ratner,16 Moore v. Bay,11 Corn Exchange 
Bank v. Klauder,18 and Constance v. Harvey19 would be minor in-
deed compared to the consequences of according to the trustee the 
position of the most preferred secured creditor of the bankrupt's 
estate. In fact, the result would be nothing less than a general 
avoidance of all junior liens and interests in bankruptcy.20 Since it 
14. Dean Hawkland has suggested that "the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial 
Code set out to drastically curtail the doctrine of Moore v . .Bay." Hawkland, The Im-
pact of the Commercial Code on the Doctrine of Moore v. Bay, 67 COM. L.J. 359, 361 
(1962). Professor Gilmore has intimated, however, that the prevailing considerations in 
the drafting of § 9-301(1)(b) were that (I) protection of lien creditors against unper-
fected security interests afforded a sufficiently effective sanction to discourage dilatori-
ness in complying with perfection requirements; and that (2) all legislation dealing with 
this subject matter drafted in this century protected only lien creditors (and purchas-
ers). 1 GILMORE 489. 
The pernicious potentialities of the doctrine derived from Moore v. Bay are discussed 
in MACLACHLAN 330-35. 
15. See 4 CoLLIER ,r 70.90, at 1729-30 (1959). The reference to Collier cited in note 2 
supra is to a portion of the treatise written by Professor Lawrence King and incorpo-
rated into Collier in 1964. The text of this article discusses only the portion of Collier, 
cited supra in this note, which was contributed in 1959. 
16. 268 U.S. 353 (1925); see, e.g., Cohen &: Gerber, Mortgages of Accounts Receivable, 
29 GEO. L.J. 555 (1941). 
17. 284 U.S. 4 (1931); see MACLACHLAN 330-33; Scott, supra note 6, at 265-69. 
18. 318 U.S. 434 (1943); see, e.g., Keeffe, Kelly &: Lewis, Sick Sixty, A Proposed Re-
vision of Section 60A of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 99 (1947); Kupfer &: Liv-
ingston, Com Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder Revisited: The After-
math of Its Implications, 32 VA. L. REv. 910 (1946). 
19. 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 391 (1956). See Marsh, supra 
note 10; Weintraub, Levin,&: Beldock, The Strong-Arm Clause Strikes the Belated Chat-
tel Mortgage, 25 FORDHAM L. REv. 261 (1956). 
20. It should be acknowledged here that no one has been so bold as to argue cate• 
gorically that the trustee should be able to assert the priority of the secured creditor 
having the topmost lien of any and every kind against the bankrupt's property. My 
point, hereinafter elaborated, is that if the trustee is allowed to assert the right of a 
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is practically impossible for a secured party to prevent the attachment 
of a prior lien of some kind, the hazards posed by bankruptcy for 
secured creditors would be more fearsome than has ever been ac-
knowledged. 
In 1951 the late Professor James MacLachlan raised the question 
here considered before the National Bankruptcy Conference.21 At its 
annual meetings in 1953 and 1954, the Conference approved his 
proposal for an amendment of section 70e limiting the trustee's 
rights thereunder to those of an unsecured creditor.22 The proposed 
amendment thereafter dropped out of drafts of section 70e con-
sidered by the Conference-no doubt for the reason that admittedly 
no case had presented the question and other problems of more 
urgency pre-empted the attention devoted to that subdivision.23 Pro-
fessor MacLachlan's treatise, which appeared in 1956, included a 
trenchant discussion of the question,24 and this article is an elabora-
tion of the position there taken-that the trustee's rights under 
section 70e are limited to those of an unsecured creditor. Judicial 
authority, while not extensive, is in accord.25 
lien creditor or any other variety of secured creditor to prevail over the rights of any 
other interest in property of a bankrupt estate without regard to the assumptions im-
plicit in the preservation provisions and the law of subrogation generally, there is no 
basis in the Bankruptcy Act for distinguishing between the kinds of liens the trustee 
can use to his advantage. See text following note 53 infra. 
21. 1951 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL 
MEETING 39. 
22. 1954 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF ANNUAL 
MEETING 8; 1953 NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS OF AN-
NUAL MEETING 10. 
23. Notably the matter of taming Constance v. Harvey, 215 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), 
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 391 (1956) which threatened to make § 70e superfluous. 
24. MACLACHLAN 335-36. Commentators in accord include Coogan & Vagts, The 
Secured Creditor and the Bankruptcy Act: An Introduction in I CooGAN, HOGAN & 
VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE U.C.C. 971, 990-91 (1963); 2 GILMORE 1289; 
Wiseman & King, Perfection, Filing and Forms Under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
merdal Code, 9 WAYNE L. R.Ev. 580, 596 (1963). 
25. Michigan Fire Ins. Co. v. Genie Craft Corp., 183 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D. Md. 1960) 
(trustee denied subrogation under § 70e to priority of federal tax lien); In re F. A. 
Whitney Carriage Co., 173 F. Supp. 709 (D. Mass. 1953) (trustee denied right to assert 
statutory lien of commonwealth as against mortgagee who allegedly failed to comply 
with bulk transfer statute); Silverman v. Wedge, 339 Mass. 244, 158 N.E.2d 668 (1959) 
(same); Sellers v. Hayes, 163 Ind. 422, 72 N.E. 119 (1904) (trustee denied benefit of statu-
tory lien conferred on wholesalers against stock of merchandise of retailer transferred 
in bulk). The state statutes considered in the Whitney, Silverman, and Sellers cases cited 
supra declared the transfers to which they applied "fraudulent and void" as against the 
protected classes of creditors. 
Attempts by the trustee to ride on the priority of a federal tax lien over security 
interests failed in two recent cases when the trustee failed to establish the existence of 
a tax lien with priority. Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Stewart, 337 F .2d 978 (9th Cir. 
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 979 (1965); Wethered v. Alban Tractor Co., 224 Md. 408, 
168 A.2d 358, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 830 (1961), 3 B.C. IND. & COM. L. R.Ev. 72 (1961). 
Neither court indicated that, had the trustee carried the burden of identifying a tax 
lien with priority, it would have sustained the claimed right of subrogation. 
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An authority citable for the proposition that the trustee under 
section 70e may assert the rights of a secured creditor is Collier on 
Bankruptcy,26 and since I share responsibility for the portion of 
Collier that discusses this matter, an explanation is in order. Three 
cases are cited therein for support, including notably Central Chan-
delier Co. v. Irving Trust Co.27 As a footnote accompanying the 
discussion in Collier explains, a secured creditor has a "provable 
claim to its full amount, even though it is allowable only as to the 
excess, if any, of the claim over the value of the security.''28 Thus, 
if a transfer by the bankrupt is voidable as against such a creditor, 
the literal language of § 70e would enable the trustee to nullify the 
voidable transfer in its entirety. The secured creditor would ulti-
mately, of course, be entitled to so much of the proceeds as were 
necessary to satisfy his lien; any excess would be for the estate. The 
Central Chandelier Co. case ... proceeds on that theory.29 
The opinion in Central Chandelier is, however, almost as cryptic 
as that in Moore v. Bay.30 A conditional seller of lighting fixtures to 
a building corporation had sued to enforce its security interest for 
the unpaid purchase price. During the pendency of this litigation 
the building corporation went into bankruptcy, and the trustee, 
having been substituted as defendant, sought to rely on the in-
26. 4 COLLIER ,f 70.90, at 1729·30 (1959). 
27. 259 N.Y. 343, 182 N.E. 10 (1932). The other cases cited are Brookhaven Bank &: 
Trust Co. v. Gwin, 253 F.2d 17, 23 n.5 (5th Cir. 1958); In re Cofax Corp., 96 F. Supp. 
420 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The following cases are then cited after the signal But cf.: Otte v. 
Landy, 143 F. Supp. 893, 900, afj'd, 256 F.2d 112 (6th Cir. 1958), discussed in notes 38 &: 
39 infra; Sellers v. Hayes, 163 Ind. 422, 72 N.E. 119 (1904), discussed in note 25 supra. 
In the footnote to the opinion in Brookhaven Bank & Trust Co. v. Gwin, cited supra, 
the court of appeals indicated that the trustee in bankruptcy could have invalidated a 
Belatedly filed chattel mortgage under § 70e by relying on the rights of an intervening 
judgment lienor. The judgment lien had been obtained over four months before bank-
ruptcy, and the court sustained the judgment creditor's claim to priority over the chat• 
tel mortgagee under Mississippi law. The observation regarding the trustee's rights was 
a dictum, inasmuch as the trustee had abandoned the property to the competing lienors 
upon learning that the proceeds were insufficient to satisfy the lien of either creditor. 
The court did not intimate whether it thought the trustee had erred in waiving further 
claim to the property or whether he might have been able to utilize the judgment credi-
tor's priority had there been a surplus over the amount of the judgment lien. 
In re Cofax, cited supra, is tenuous authority for allowing the trustee to assert the 
priority of a tax lienor against the competing lien of a judgment creditor under § 70e. 
The judgment creditor had served a third-party subpoena on a debtor of the bankrupt 
over four months before bankruptcy, but the court identified three alternate grounds 
for rejecting the judgment creditor's claim of a lien: (I) the period of limitations ap-
plicable to the lien had run out; (2) the judgment creditor had waived his lien by filing 
an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy proceeding; and (3) the state and city of New 
York and the federal government had priority over the judgment creditor's claim of 
lien, and, as claimants with provable claims, they afforded the trustee a position from 
which to assert priority. The court did not consider the status of the tax liens indepen-
dently of their relation to the judgment creditor's claim. 
28. 4 COLLIER 1[ 70.90, at 1730 n.28 (1959). 
29. Ibid. 
30. And no lower court opinion in Central Chandelier was reported. 
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validity of the conditional sale as against a mortgagee of the real 
estate. The mortgagee was entitled to prevail under section 7 of the 
Uniform Conditional Sales Act,31 then in force, by virtue of an 
advance which had been made after the affixation of the fixtures but 
without actual or constructive notice of the retention of title. The 
lower courts had ruled for the defendant trustee, and on appeal the 
vendor challenged the standing of the trustee to rely on the superior 
rights of the mortgagee as a defense to the action. The court of ap-
peals rejected the vendor's contention on this point with the unen-
lightening observation that 
the trustee represents . . . all creditors, and is thus interested in pre-
serving the assets of the estate. Incidentally, the trustee is interested 
in preserving the validity of the mortgage security for the title com-
pany and thus reducing a possible deficiency judgment against the 
bankrupt.32 
The statement in Collier that the trustee may assert a secured 
creditor's right to avoid a transfer in its entirety, although the 
trustee could reach only the surplus over the amount required to 
satisfy the lien,33 is correct in the light of the doctrine of Moore v. 
Bay which underlies it. Thus, suppose that over four months before 
bankruptcy a creditor of the bankrupt obtained a lien by an attach-
ment or creditor's bill in a proceeding instituted to avoid a fraudu-
lent transfer of the property subjected to the lien. Although the 
lien itself would not be avoidable by the trustee, he should be per-
mitted to intervene in the litigation as a co-plaintiff. In the event of 
successful prosecution of the action to avoid the transfer, the trustee 
31. The second sentence of which read in pertinent part as follows: 
If the goods are so affixed to realty at the time of a conditional sale or subsequently 
as to become part thereof but to be severable without material injury to the free-
hold, the reservation of property shall be void after the goods are so affixed as 
against subsequent purchasers of the realty for value and without notice of the 
conditional seller's title, unless the conditional sale con1ract • • • shall be filed 
before such purchase in the office where a deed of the realty would be recorded 
• • • to affect such realty. 
UNIFORM CONDITIONAL SALES Acr § 7. 
32. 259 N.Y. at 347, 182 N.E. at 12. One can only speculate as to why the plaintiff 
did not join the mortgagee as a codefendant with the mortgagor in its action, but in 
any event it is ordinarily inappropriate for the trustee to seek to vindicate the priority 
of one secured creditor over that of another. Insofar as the trustee succeeded in reducing 
the possible deficiency judgment of the mortgagee by preserving the validity of the 
mortgage, he presumably augmented the deficiency claim of another secured creditor. 
A more substantial justification for according standing to the trustee to invoke the 
priority of the mortgage would have been to enable him to avoid the risk of a judgment 
binding him to honor the conditional seller's priority in the proceeds of the sale of the 
encumbered property while the estate remained subject to a probable liability to the 
mortgagee as the holder of a first lien against the same property. Such a rationale, of 
course, falls considerably short of recognizing that the trustee was subrogated to the 
priority of the mortgagee or to any right of avoidance of the conditional sale. 
33. Quoted in text accompanying note 29 supra. 
1428 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:1419 
would be able to reach any excess value in the property transferred 
-that is, if the secured creditor had a provable claim.34 It would be 
unnecessary for the trustee to show that the transfer was fraudulent 
and voidable as to any other creditor, for, in such a case, the trustee 
would not be relying on the priority of the creditor's lien, but rather 
on the voidability of the transfer by the creditor. The observation 
in Collier35 that Central Chandelier Co. proceeds on this theory is 
conjectural, since the court does not disclose any theory or indeed 
whether it was concerned with any surplus above the amount re-
quired to pay the mortgagee. In any event, the situation presented 
in that case did not afford the trustee any justification for invoca-
tion of the theory, since the conditional seller's interest was voidable 
by the mortgagee not as a creditor but as a subsequent purchaser of 
the realty for value and without notice of the conditional seller's 
title.36 To allow the trustee to take the particularly privileged 
position of such a purchaser because the purchaser also happened 
to be a creditor with a provable claim would involve a perversion 
of the purposes of both the state law and the Bankruptcy Act.37 
III. THE TRUSTEE'S RIGHT TO PRIORITY UNDER SECTION 70E 
On a purely semantic level, the mischief that may be generated 
by subrogating the trustee to secured creditors' rights under section 
70e may be confined by insisting that the subdivision does not enable 
the trustee to assert the priority of any creditor with a provable claim 
over any transferee; rather, the statute enables the trustee only to 
invoke any rule of law which makes a transfer "fraudulent or void-
able for any other reason by any creditor of the debtor.''38 This sug-
gestion admittedly relies heavily on the lexicon of the legislator. 
34. Carothers v. Weaver, 220 Ala. 584, 586, 127 So. 151, 152 (1930) (creditor holding 
indefeasible lien by creditor's bill not displaced but trustee allowed to join in suit on 
behalf of unsecured creditors to reach any surplus above lien). 
35. 4 COLLIER ,1170.90, at 1730 n.28 (1959). 
36. "The implication of the second sentence of § 7 is that one not a subsequent pur-
chaser of the realty for value and without notice-e.g., a trustee in bankruptcy--cannot 
object to a failure of the conditional vendor to comply with the filing requirements 
prescribed by the sentence." 4 COLLIER 11 70.20, at ll60 n.23 (1959). 
37. Candor requires an acknowledgment that the critique of Central Chandelier set 
out in the text is not entirely in accord with the discussion of the same case in the pas-
sages of Collier which are cited in notes 26-29 supra. That discussion was part of a 
revision of the original version of 11 70.90 included in the 14th edition of that work 
which I prepared in 1959. I can only say that I state the case as it appears to me now, 
38. This ground was explicitly taken in rejecting a trustee's attack under § 70e in 
Otte v. Landy, 143 F. Supp. 893, 900 (E.D. Mich. 1956), aff d, 256 F.2d ll3 (6th Cir. 
1958), and in Michigan Fire &: Marine Ins. Co. v. Genie Craft Corp., 183 F. Supp. 533, 
537 (D. Md. 1960). It is also ventured as a basis for denying the trustee a right to pre-
vail over an unperfected security interest in fixtures in Coogan, Security Interests in 
Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1319, 1339 (1962), re-
printed in 1 CooGAN, HoGAN &: VAGTS, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1804. Mr. Coogan reports 
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The Code generally eschews saying that any security interest is 
voidable by another. Thus, section 9-301 is entitled "Persons Who 
Take Priority Over Unperfected Security Interests." Subsection (1) 
then lists persons to whose rights an unperfected security interest is 
subordinate and includes therein a "lien creditor without knowl-
edge." The Internal Revenue Code, on the other hand, declares 
that the federal tax lien shall not be valid as against a security inter-
est unless notice is filed.39 It would be an indefensible interpreta-
tion of section 70e to permit the trustee to invoke the position of 
the holder of a security interest against a subsequently filed tax lien 
because the latter is invalidated, but deny the trustee the position 
of a lien creditor who levies before a security interest is perfected 
because the latter is merely subordinated. The point, however, is 
that the trustee should be subrogated to neither the priority of a 
lien creditor under section 9-301 nor to the right of any of the bene-
ficiaries of the tax notice-filing statute unless the trustee can displace 
the lien or other interest of the protected party. 
If a creditor should exploit the easy opportunity afforded by the 
Code to obtain and perfect a security interest against all of the 
debtor's personal property and fixtures, the trustee could step into 
the advantageous position occupied by such a creditor as against 
all inferior interests and liens upon the collateral. Moreover, even 
that farsighted and hard-fisted creditor could be frustrated by the 
trustee if the trustee could find a subsequent purchase-money secu-
rity interest holder who took the precautions prescribed by section 
9-312(3) or (4).40 And the purchase-money secured creditor could be 
that Collier cites Central Chandelier Co. v. Irving Trust Co. as contra in the passages 
discussed in the text accompanying notes 26-29 supra, and then notes that the court did 
not there mention § 70e. As pointed out in the text accompanying note 31 supra, the 
trustee was relying on § 7 of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, which did not merely 
confer a priority but purported to make the conditional seller's security interest void as 
against the mortgagee. Although § 70e was not cited by the court, it is the only provi-
sion which would have authorized him to represent the creditors in resisting the suit 
by the conditional seller. 
39. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a). 
40. I have encountered the suggestion that although a lien creditor is merely ac-
corded priority over an unperfected security interest by § 9-30l(b) of the Code, the provi-
sion is actually an avoidance section and therefore is a state law of the kind contemplated 
by § 70e of the act. This argument is supposed to draw strength from the following 
propositions: (1) the Code's requirement that most kinds of personal property security 
be perfected by notice-filing or the taking of possession in order to prevail as against 
lien creditors is a rule intended to protect creditors against the misleading appearance 
of unencumbered ownership in their debtor; (2) the law of ostensible ownership, deriv-
ing as it does from Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Ch. 1601), is part 
of the law of fraudulent conveyances; and (3) any law protecting creditors against fraud-
ulent conveyances or secret liens is a law which Congress intended to be available to 
the trustee under § 70e. 
Whenever applicable state law requires any instrument affecting real estate to be 
recorded in order to be valid as against a judgment lienor, the trustee would, under 
1430 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 65:1419 
cut out too if the trustee could find a tax lien or any other variety of 
statutory lien having priority under applicable law, including section 
9-310 of the Code. 
An unsecured creditor sometimes has priority over a security 
interest under nonbankruptcy law. Curiously it has seldom been 
suggested that the trustee in bankruptcy should be able to exploit 
the priority of such a creditor in order to defeat a security interest. 
The Bankruptcy Act has its own system of priorities for unsecured 
creditors. While limited recognition is given to priorities conferred 
by nonbankruptcy law in section 64a(5),41 state-created priorities 
are generally ineffective in bankruptcy. Thus there would be no sig-
nificant problem of displacement if the trustee were allowed to be 
subrogated to the priority of an unsecured creditor over a security 
interest. The suggestion nevertheless runs counter to the uniform 
construction of the act. 42 
this kind of argument, be entitled to invoke § 70e if a judgment lien attached to the 
property after the debtor-owner had executed an instrument of transfer but before it 
could be recorded. And presumably the trustee would be able to assert the right of the 
United States as a tax lienor against any prior security interest that is not protected 
against a judgment lien creditor at the time the tax lien is filed, since the Internal 
Revenue Code manifestly undertakes to afford the Government all the protection ap• 
plicable state law gives to judgment lien creditors against secret liens. INT. R.Ev. CODE 
OF 1954, §§ 6323(a) &: (h)(l). 
If I understand the argument now being considered regarding the legitimate use of 
§ 70e by the trustee as a subrogee of a lien creditor, the trustee would not be able to 
step into the shoes of a creditor who acquired his lien before any competing interest 
attached. In that situation, the lien creditor would prevail because of his priority and 
not because of any right of avoidance, and the trustee would have no basis for subroga-
tion under § 70e. Although it would not make any difference for any other purpose, it 
would thus be crucial in the application of this subdivision whether the security in-
terest under attack attached before or after the property became subject to the conflict-
ing lien relied on by the trustee. 
The cases cited in note 38 supra which deny trustees' efforts to assert the priority 
of tax creditors may be thought to be reconcilable with the argument here considered. 
The unsuccessful trustee in Michigan Fire &: Marine Ins. Co. v. Genie Craft Corp., 183 
F. Supp. 533 (D. Md. 1960), was, however, relying on the "ineffectiveness" of an equi• 
table lien asserted by the bankrupt's financier as against a tax lien which arose after the 
equitable lien was supposed to have attached. 
Suppose that after A obtains a security interest in the personalty of D but before 
the security interest is perfected, B, a creditor of D, with a provable claim, obtains and 
perfects a security interest in the same collateral. Has B a right of avoidance to which 
the trustee is subrogated under § 70e, or merely a right of priority which does not pass 
to the trustee under this section? The argument of this article is that the trustee can 
avail himself of B's priority if but only if he can avoid B's security interest, for exam-
ple, as a preference under § 60 or as a fraudulent transfer under § 70e. In such an event 
the trustee would be limited as subrogee by the amount of B's claim. 
41. Section 64a(5) recognizes a limited priority for a landlord when granted by state 
law and priority for nontax claims of the United States when the conditions of REv. 
STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964) are met. The priority so recognized is the 
lowest of the five levels provided by § 64, and the fact that nonbankruptcy law may 
assign first rank to an unsecured claim of the landlord or the Government is ineffective 
to lift it above the station prescribed in the Bankruptcy Act. 30 Stat. 563 (1898), as 
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964). 
42. Shortly after the decision of the Third Circuit in In re Quaker City Uniform 
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The most serious objection to allowing the trustee under .section 
70e to assert the priority of any unsecured creditor with a provable 
claim over a security interest is that it would enable the trustee to 
invoke the notorious doctrine of the inchoate lien that has developed 
in the application of the federal priority statute.43 Efforts of Govern-
ment counsel to get the absolute priority afforded their client by the 
Supreme Court's construction of this statute have been rebuffed by 
bankruptcy courts,44 and, except for a wayward Ninth Circuit ruling 
of a few years ago, 45 the trustee in bankruptcy has been unable to 
tum the doctrine of the inchoate lien to his advantage. 
I have elsewhere elaborated the implications for secured creditors 
of allowing the trustee to defeat any lien that cannot meet the 
esoteric test of choateness which has been established by the Su-
preme Court for the administration of estates of insolvent debtors 
of the Government outside of bankruptcy.46 Although the doctrine 
Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1030 (1956), Referee Wolfe interpreted 
it to require him to subordinate security interests to the landlord's priority conferred 
by Pennsylvania law. In re George Townsend Co., 31 REF. J. 54 (1956). The ruling was 
reversed by the district court, 180 F. Supp. 625 (E.D. Pa. 1957). A footnote in the court's 
opinion, 180 F. Supp. at 626 n.3, mentioned that neither counsel nor the judge could 
find any support in Pennsylvania law for the proposition that a landlord's priority was 
superior to a consensual security interest, but the court's ruling rested on the ground 
that, except as provided in § 67c, § 64 is inoperative until after valid liens are satisfied. 
The relationship between priorities and liens is discussed generally in 3 COLLIER 
1f 64.02[2] (1966). 
43. REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1964). The doctrine is discussed in 
Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of 
the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905 (1954), and Kennedy, From Spokane 
County to Vermont: The Campaign of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate 
Lien, 50 IOWA L. REv. 724 (1965). 
44. See, e.g., United States v • .Bradley, 321 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1963); Adams v. O'Mal-
ley, 182 F.2d 925,927, 930 (8th Cir. 1950); United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731, 734-35 
(9th Cir. 1946); In re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711, 714 (W.D. Ky. 1943). 
Insofar as the cases cited herein deal with the priority of the federal tax lien, they 
are subject to re-examination in the light of the development of the doctrine of the 
inchoate lien discussed in the articles cited in note 43 supra and the enactment of the 
Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966. 80 Stat. 1125 (1966), 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 (Supp. 1967). The 
opinions stand unimpaired insofar as they deal with the relevance of R.Ev. STAT. § 3466 
(1875) in bankruptcy. The ruling in United States v. Reese, 131 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1942), 
wherein the court apparently amalgamated the federal priority with the federal tax lien 
statute, turned out to be an inadvertent precursor of United States v. Security Trust 
&: Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). The debtor in that case was a bankrupt, but the ques-
tion therein decided arose in a case consolidating plenary actions of the United States 
and the state of Illinois to foreclose their tax liens against the bankrupt's property. 
45. Rialto Publishing Co. v. Bass, 325 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1963). The rationale for 
Rialto was substantially revised by the court of appeals sitting en bane in Bass v. Stodd, 
357 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1966). 
46. See Kennedy, The Inchoate Lien in Bankruptcy: Some Reflections on Rialto 
Publishing Co. v. Bass, 17 STAN. L. REv. 793 (1965). The priority statute applies only 
when such a debtor has committed an act of bankruptcy, but there is no four-month 
time limit prescribed in the statute. There is a question whether the Government has 
a provable claim for taxes in bankruptcy, inasmuch as § 63 does not include such a 
claim in its catalogue of provable claims; this doubt, however, is hardly a serious one. 
The ruling by the referee on this point in In re Cofax Corp., 96 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 
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of the inchoate lien as it formerly applied in tax lien cases has been 
significantly modified by the Tax Lien Act of 1966,47 this legislation 
does not affect the priority of the United States under the general 
priority statute;48 not since the Court launched the doctrine of the 
inchoate lien nearly forty years ago has it found a lien challenged 
by the Government in a case under the statute to be sufficiently 
choate to withstand the federal priority. Therefore, if the trustee 
could exploit the federal priority under section 70e, the risks as-
sumed by secured creditors would be significantly aggravated: Any 
unpaid indebtedness to the federal government of any kind and of 
any amount would afford the trustee a basis for leveling practically 
every security interest against the property of the bankrupt.49 
It is entirely possible to recognize that creditors with provable 
claims may include one who is secured and that the trustee may 
assert the rights of avoidance of such a creditor without agreeing 
that the trustee is thereby subrogated to rights that depend on that 
creditor's security interest rather than on his status as a creditor. 
Thus a creditor holding a consensual security interest may avoid a 
fraudulent transfer or one that fails to comply with Article Six of the 
Code (Bulk Transfers) even if he is ordinarily better advised to rely 
on his security than on his right of avoidance.50 Waiver of his secu-
rity would not prejudice his right of avoidance. 51 On the other hand, 
the lien creditor who prevails over an unfi.led or belatedly filed 
1951), is not subject to criticism. See Hartman v. Lauchli, 238 F.2d 881, 888 (8th Cir. 
1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957); Ingels v. Boteler, 100 F.2d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 
1938), afj'd, 308 U.S. 57 (1939); In re Mercury Engineering, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 376, 382 
(S.D. Cal. 1946) ('A tax or any exaction in the nature of a tax, while not strictly a debt, 
is none the less a demand or claim of a quasi-contractual nature provable in bank-
ruptcy"); 3 COLLIER 1J 63.26 (1966). 
47. BO Stat. 1125 (1966), 26 U.S.C.A. § 6323 (Supp. 1967). 
48. PLUMB&: WRIGHT, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 162-63 (2d ed. 1967). 
49. In Otte v. Landy, 143 F. Supp. 893 (E.D. Mich. 1956), afj'd, 256 F.2d 112 (6th 
Cir. 1958), the trustee, in attacking a mortgage given by the bankrupt to secure a pur-
chase-money obligation of $3,150,000, relied in part on an argument that he was en-
titled under § 70e to assert the priority of the United States for its unpaid tax claims 
of $160,000. Had the court sustained the argument, it would have served to enable the 
trustee to invalidate the purchase-money mortgage on a showing of a dollar's worth of 
debt to the United States. For a less dismal view of the chances for the holder of a 
consensual security interest to survive competition with the federal priority than is 
taken in the text, see PLUMB &: WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 48, at 161-62. 
50. But cf. Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 201 F.2d 635, 639 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. 
dismissed on stipulation of counsel, 346 U.S. 863 (1953): 
[L]ike any other equitable remedy, "avoidance" of the "transfer": i.e., rescission, is 
a remedy dependent upon balancing the relative interests involved, and in a case 
where the injured party has another and a complete remedy and where rescission 
will deprive the wrongdoer of rights which are his in spite of his wrong, a court of 
equity will not grant rescission. 
51. Buffum v. Peter Barceloux Co., 289 U.S. 227, 234 (1933). One may indeed be 
estopped from asserting rights as a secured creditor and as an unsecured creditor in 
respect of the same property when both positions are mutually inconsistent. Ibid. 
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security interest under section 9-301 of the Code does so only by 
virtue of the priority of his lien. Waiver or avoidance of his lien 
would defeat his right to prevail over the security interest. Insofar 
as one secured creditor prevails over another under any rule deter-
mining the validity or priority of liens inter se, it would be a wholly 
arbitrary and fanciful result for the priority or validity of one of 
them to be used as the basis for destroying the rights of the other in 
what remains of the collateral after the first lien has been wholly 
satisfied. A rule giving A priority over B should not, after it has 
served to protect A against B, be reloaded to knock out B altogether 
for the sake of claimants who were never intended to be protected 
by the rule giving A priority. Such perversion of the purposes of 
state law to the end of enlarging bankruptcy estates should not be 
enforced by the courts unless compelled in unmistakable terms by 
the Bankruptcy Act. No such compulsion is to be found in section 
70e.52 
The proponents of the view that the trustee may be subrogated 
to the rights of a secured creditor for the purpose of avoiding a 
transfer under section 70e have supposed only that the trustee might 
step into the shoes of a judicial lien creditor or tax lienor.53 But is 
there any warrant for distinguishing between the right of subroga-
tion to the position of such a creditor and the right to assert the 
position of a creditor whose priority rests on his being the first to per-
fect a consensual security interest? Clearly the source and nature of 
the lien of a secured creditor is a matter of indifference in determin-
ing the provability of his claim. Accordingly it appears that if the 
trustee can assert the rights that inhere in the secured status rather 
than the creditor status of such a creditor, he can elect to take the 
52. An analysis of the role of § 70e substantially in accord with the text is found in 
the opinion of Judge Learned Hand in Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 201 F.2d 635, 639-
40 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed on stipulation of counsel, 346 U.S. 863 (1953): 
It seems likely that the proper interpretation of the section [70eJ is that it applies 
only to occasions where the "Federal or State law" "under" which the "transfer" is 
"avoided" directly nullifies it ex proprio vigore, and not indirectly by creating 
rights (e.g. a lien) out of some transactions between one creditor and the bankrupt 
which the "transfer" would defeat, if it were valid; in short that the "creditor's" 
right must be conferred upon him simply because he is a creditor. One can see how 
the .Bankruptcy Act might wish to provide that the benefit of such a "law" should 
redound to the benefit of all creditors; but to go further seems to us to impute to 
Congress a most improbable intent. Suppose, for example, that the bankrupt bor-
rows money from A upon an agreement that A shall have as security a one half 
interest in the bankrupt's stock in trade, or the whole interest in a specified part 
of that stock; and that the bankrupt then "transfers" the stock to B, who takes 
with notice of the agreement. A can "avoid" the "transfer" as to his interest in the 
stock; but may the bankrupt's trustee reclaim as part of the estate, not only that 
half, but the half which A [the bankrupt?] was free to "transfer" and B to receive? 
If so .B has lost what he was confessedly free to acquire as a penalty for taking from 
A what he was not free to acquire. 
53. See notes 1-2 supra. 
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position of whatever secured creditor is most advantageously placed 
in order to level all liens and interests inferior to him, whatever their 
source and character. 
The difficulty with recognizing subrogation of the trustee to the 
rights of the holder of any valid lien of any variety is the same, and 
it is fundamental: Section 70e was intended to enable the trustee 
to bring into the estate for distribution property which the debtor 
has put beyond his reach but which the creditors could have reached 
by appropriate action but for bankruptcy. The subdivision has been 
interpreted in the light of this entirely intelligible purpose, and even 
Moore v. Bay is consistent with the limitation that the rights of the 
trustee by subrogation be derived from unsecured creditors. To vest 
him with the special rights, whether of priority or avoidance, belong-
ing to secured creditors whom he does not represent and whom he 
cannot displace requires an attribution to Congress of an irrational 
design to invalidate all but one layer of liens against bankrupt estates. 
IV. SUBROGATION OF THE TRUSTEE TO THE RIGHTS OF A 
CREDITOR HoLDING A VOIDABLE LmN 
There is no departure from the Bankruptcy Act if the right of 
the trustee to be subrogated to the position of a secured creditor is 
confined to those cases in which the secured creditor can be displaced 
by avoidance of his lien. It is nonetheless submitted that, with a single 
qualification hereafter noted,54 invocation of the doctrine of Moore 
v. Bay to enable the trustee to extend the priority of the secured 
creditor without limitation is incompatible with the design of the 
act. 
Thus, suppose that during a day's delay in the perfection of a 
mortgage of a $10,000 chattel to secure a present advance of $10,000, 
a creditor with a $1,000 claim attached the asset. If bankruptcy should 
ensue within four months, the trustee could avoid the attachment lien 
under section 67a on a showing that the bankrupt was insolvent at 
the time of the attachment. Avoidance of the lien, however, would 
be bootless for the estate if the result is simply to remove a limitation 
on the enforcement of the mortgage. To protect the estate against 
such an eventuality, that is, having the avoidance redound to the 
benefit of junior lienors or other persons not intended to be bene-
fitted by the administration of the estate in bankruptcy, Congress 
provided in section 67a for preservation of the $1,000 lien for the 
benefit of the estate. The attaching creditor would be in no position 
54. See text accompanying note 69 infra. 
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to complain of losing his lien to the estate because his lien conflicted 
with the policy of the Bankruptcy Act embodied in section 67a. Nor 
would the secured creditor be in a position to complain of the preser-
vation since he would not be prejudiced thereby. Nonetheless, the 
argument has been made that in the situation presented, if the at-
taching creditor has a provable claim, the trustee should be able to 
invoke section 70e as against the chattel mortgage and he should not 
be limited by the $1,000 claim of the attaching creditor when he pro-
ceeds under this section.1m The argument, however, makes the preser-
vation provision superfluous in the situation for which it was de-
signed.56 
The preservation clauses of sections 60b, 67a(3), 67d, and 70e 
are no more than provisions authorizing the trustee to be subrogated 
to the rights of a person who can no longer enforce them under the 
Bankruptcy Act, when unconditional avoidance of such rights would 
not benefit the estate. Such a situation is presented when a voidable 
lien or other interest is superior to another lien or interest that is 
indefeasible by the trustee. It would be a perversion of the purpose 
of the avoidance provisions of the act for the trustee to strike down a 
lien or other interest for the benefit of persons who are not intended 
beneficiaries of the trust being administered in bankruptcy and 
against whom the voidable lien or other interest is entirely valid. 
But it would be an invidious and patently unintended construction 
of the act to allow the trustee to preserve the priority of a lien or 
other interest voidable under the act as against the holder of an 
interest otherwise indefeasible but to insist that as trustee he is in 
no way limited by the amount of the lien or interest preserved. Un-
der such a construction the trustee takes everything if he can take 
55. The argument is suggested rather than supported in COUNTRYMAN, CAsES ON 
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 454, 522-23 (1964), and Loiseaux, Federal Tax Liens in Bank-
ruptcy, 15 VANn. L. REv. 137, 145-46 (1961). 
A case made to order for exploitation of the view of the trustee's rights of unlimited 
subrogation to the priority of the holder of a lien voidable under the act is In re 
Andrews, 172 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1949). Here a chattel mortgage securing a $3,200 claim 
became voidable by the trustee under § 70e by virtue of a delay in the effectiveness of the 
filing of the mortgage. A junior chattel mortgage securing a claim of $10,500 was in-
defeasible by the trustee but was not permitted to take advantage of the gap in the 
perfection of the senior mortgage because the junior mortgagee was in no way prejudiced 
thereby. The collateral sold for $14,100. The court apparently limited the trustee's 
recovery under § 70e to $3,600. Although the trustee was represented by counsel of 
acknowledged competence, no effort was apparently made to invoke Moore v. Bay as a 
weapon against the junior mortgage. No criticism of counsel is intended. On the con-
trary, as I have tried to show in this article, employment of that case for such a purpose 
would turn its doubtful doctrine against innocent parties for no other reason than 
that their collateral was subject to another rival lien or interest voidable by the trustee 
in bankruptcy. 
56. See 4 COLLIER 1[ 67.16. 
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anything. This is of course the oft-repeated and oft-rejected objection 
directed at the doctrine of Moore v. Bay. Here, however, the doctrine 
is being used to defeat utterly the rights of persons who by hypothe-
sis do not fall under the condemnation of any provision or policy of 
the act; it is only fortuitous that their rights attach to property sub-
ject to a competing lien or interest voidable by the trustee. It is one 
thing to insist that such persons not enjoy a windfall in the event of 
bankruptcy. It is another to say that Congress has demanded from 
such persons a sacrifice of their rights to the Moloch of Bankruptcy. 
Prior to the Chandler Act, there were three provisions in the 
Bankruptcy Act which authorized subrogation of the trustee to the 
priority rights of creditors displaced by the trustee. All of these pro-
visions were in section 67. Section 67b read as follows: 
Whenever a creditor is prevented from enforcing his rights as against 
a lien created, or attempted to be created, by his debtor, who after-
wards becomes a bankrupt, the trustee of the estate of such bankrupt 
shall be subrogated to and may enforce such rights of such creditor 
for the benefit of the estate. 57 
Section 67c, which is one of the precursors of present section 67a, 
provided that 
if the dissolution ... [of any lien thereunder] would militate 
against the best interests of the estate of such person the same shall 
not be dissolved, but the trustee of the estate of such person, for the 
benefit of the estate, shall be subrogated to the rights of the holder 
of such lien and em powered to perfect and enforce the same in his 
name as trustee with like force and effect as such holder might have 
done had not bankruptcy proceedings intervened.58 
Finally, an overlapping provision in section 67f, also one of the pre-
cursors of present section 67a, nullified liens obtained through legal 
proceedings but qualified such nullification by a clause authorizing 
the court 
on due notice, [to] order that the right under such levy, judgment, 
attachment, or other lien shall be preserved for the benefit of the 
estate; and thereupon the same may pass to and shall be preserved 
by the trustee for the benefit of the estate as aforesaid. 5o 
It was thus clear that the trustee might step into the shoes of any 
creditor who but for bankruptcy could have enforced rights against 
any lien or other interest created by his debtor. However, no one 
57. 30 Stat. 564 (1898). 
58. 30 Stat. 564 (1898). 
59. 30 Stat. 565 (1898). 
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seems to have suggested before 1938 that the trustee could also step 
into the shoes of any creditor who notwithstanding bankruptcy could 
enforce rights against any lien created by the debtor or of any creditor 
whose lien was not voidable under section 67c or section 67f.60 
The subrogation provision of old subdivision b was eliminated 
in the Chandler Act's recast of section 67, with this less than adequate 
legislative explanation: "The substance of subdivision b is . . . 
covered by the provision in the expanded section 60b, which confers 
upon the trustee the subrogated right to retain the benefits of an 
avoided preferential lien."61 As noted above, subdivisions c and f of 
old section 67 were merged in the new section 67a. Inexplicably no 
preservation provisions were included in the other avoidance sections 
until 1952, when preservation provisos were inserted in sections 67d 
and 70e.62 The legislative reports accompanying the amendment of 
section 70e explained the purpose of the preservation proviso as that 
of "subrogating the trustee to the rights of the transferee . . . so 
that the benefits intended for the estate would not be passed on to 
junior interests not entitled thereto."63 
When subdivisions c and f of old section 67 were merged into the 
new subdivision a in 1938, the preservation clause of old subdivision 
f rather than the language of subrogation used in old subdivision c 
was carried over into new section 67a(3). However, since the effect of 
an order preserving a lien for the benefit of the estate is precisely the 
same as an order authorizing subrogation of the trustee to the rights 
of the holder of a voidable lien, no significance is to be attached to 
this stylistic choice.64 
The language of former section 67c was explicit in limiting the 
trustee's rights as subrogee to those of the holder of the lien dissolved 
by the subdivision. It is inherent in the notion of subrogation, how-
ever, that the person subrogated acquires no greater rights than 
60. Cf. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY 179 (Students' ed. 1911): 
[T]here still exist those cases where a chattel mortgagee has filed bis mortgage 
after a levy by some creditor upon the property and before the bankruptcy court 
bas seized the property, in which event, only by virtue of subrogation to the credi-
tor's lien would the trustee be able to invalidate the chattel mortgage; such sub-
rogation, however, only being possible where the legal proceedings bad created 
the lien within the four months preceding the bankruptcy. 
61. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1937). 
62. 66 Stat. 429, 430 (1952). 
63. H.R. REP. No, 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1952); S. REP. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 
2d Sess. 19 (1952). 
64. There was another difference between former subdivisions c and f which dis-
appeared in the merger: Subrogation was apparently automatic under subdivision c on 
a finding that dissolution "would militate against the best interests of the estate," 
whereas an order of preservation under subdivision f was discretionary, as it is under 
present subdivision a. This difference was of more theoretical than actual significance. 
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those of the person to whose position he is subrogated.65 Although 
judicial declaration or exposition of these truisms does not abound, 
no case construing the preservation clauses of the Bankruptcy Act has 
been found to cast any doubt upon them.66 
The addition of the preservation clauses in 1938 and 1952 con-
stitutes convincing evidence that Congress has not adopted the view 
that the trustee may utilize section 70e as brigaded by Moore v. Bay 
whenever he can find a creditor with a provable claim and a lien 
prior to other liens. If the trustee could step into the shoes of a prior 
lienor without being limited by the amount of his lien, the addition 
of these clauses would have been largely gratuitous legislation.67 On 
the contrary, however, the legislative explanations indicate an appre-
hension of a need to be served by the amendments which is entirely 
consonant with the scheme of the act herein elaborated. 68 The ab-
sence of any acknowledgment or intimation that the trustee had an 
65. DIXON, SUBROGATION 20 (1862); 5 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.) A.ND 
EQUITABLE REMEDIES (2d ed.) 5198 (1919); SHELDON, THE LA.w OF SUBROGATION 8 (2d ed. 
1893). 
66. See, e.g., Rocle Island Plow Co. v. Reardon, 222 U.S. 354 (1912); First Nat'l Bank 
v. Staake, 202 U.S. 141 (1906). In the last cited case, attachment liens securing claims of 
$40,000 were preserved pursuant to former § 67f for the benefit of the estate of a bank-
rupt who had sold the property for $500,000 in stoclc after the attachment but before 
the bankruptcy. The Court pointed out that the effect of the order of the preservation 
was that "so much of the value of the property attached as is represented by the at-
tachments passes to the trustee for the benefit of the entire body of creditors •••. " 
202 U.S. at 146. 
67. According to this view of § 70e, there is no need for a preservation provision 
when the holder of an avoided lien or other interest has a provable claim. The avoid-
ance under §§ 60 or 67 eliminates the embarrassment created by his claim of lien or 
other interest as against the trustee, and § 70e enables him to devastate inferior liens 
and interests. 
68. See text accompanying note 60 supra. See also H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 
2d Sess. 14, 15, 16 (1952); Duberstein, Highlights of Bankruptcy Amendments, 27 REF. 
J. 21 (1952). It is nevertheless arguable that the preservation provisions were not neces-
sary to prevent proceedings for avoidance from redounding to the benefit of the holders 
of junior indefeasible interests. See In re Edward Bibinger, Inc., 12 App. Div. 2d 
237, 239, 210 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (1961) (assignee allowed to assert priority or an un-
filed mortgage as against subsequent indefeasible mortgage, without statutory authoriza-
tion therefor, to avoid "unearned windfall" to junior mortgagee-senior mortgage con-
sumed the entire property); cf. In re Andrews, 172 F.2d 996 (7th Cir. 1949) (security 
interest voidable by trustee under § 70e not preserved as against indefeasible junior 
security interest, but windfall prevented by allowing holder of voidable lien to collect 
out of fund allocated to junior Iienor). Preservation of liens postponed by former 
§ 67c(l) for the benefit of claims entitled to priority under §§ 64a(l) &: (2) was effectuated 
without express statutory authority in California State Dep't of Employment v. United 
States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954). See also Jordan v. Hamlett, 312 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir. 
1963); In re American Zyloptic Co., 181 F. Supp. 77 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). The necessity of 
legislation to prevent escalation by junior interests in consequence of avoidance is 
asserted in In re Espelund, 181 F. Supp. 108, 112 (W.D. Wash. 1959); Sachs, Trustee's 
Rights of Subrogation to Creditor's Liens, 15 REF. J. 105 (1941). The view espoused by 
these authorities, like the official explanations cited supra, do not comport with the 
suggestion that the trustee can be subrogated to the priority of any creditor with a 
voidable lien under § 70e and can cram down all inferior interests without limit. 
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alternative remedy more potent than that being provided by the 
amendments is eloquent evidence of an understanding that no such 
remedy was available. 
It should nevertheless be clear that the trustee is not bound by 
the limits of a voidable lien if he otherwise has a right of recovery 
under section 70e. Thus, suppose that within four months after a 
creditor has obtained a lien by attachment, creditor's bill, or judg-
ment, against property fraudulently transferred, the debtor becomes 
bankrupt. Although the trustee may be able to get the lien preserved 
for the benefit of the estate pursuant to section 67a(3), he is not 
bound to choose that remedy if section 70e affords him a larger recov-
ery. That proposition had been established before the advent of 
Moore v. Bay and stands independently of it.69 The significance of 
Moore v. Bay in this situation is that, as indicated above, the trustee 
may avoid the lien of the creditor under section 67a and, relying on 
the same creditor's right to avoid the transfer under section 70e, re-
cover the fraudulently transferred property without being limited by 
the amount of that creditor's claim. This result is simply an illustra-
tion of the anomalies that flow from the doctrine of Moore v. Bay. 
SUMMARY 
I. The trustee may under section 70e avoid any security interest 
that is voidable by a creditor with a provable claim against the estate, 
for example, on the ground that the security interest is a fraudulent 
transfer, irrespective of whether the creditor's claim is also allowable 
or secured. 
2. Under the doctrine of Moore v. Bay, the trustee is not re-
stricted in his recovery under section 70e by the amount of the claim 
of the creditor whose right of avoidance he asserts under this sub-
division. 
3. If an unsecured creditor of the estate has merely a right of 
priority over a security interest as distinguished from a right of avoid-
ance, the trustee is not entitled to assert the right of priority in dero-
gation of a secured creditor's rights in the collateral. 
4. The trustee may under section 70c assert all the rights of 
69. In Campbell v. Calcasieu Nat'l Bank, 12 F.2d 981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 
U.S. 720 (1926), a creditor had obtained a lien by judgment in proceedings to avoid a 
mortgage as fraudulent. The judgment lien was held voidable under former § 67f and 
subject to preservation under the same subdivision, but the court properly pointed out 
that the trustee's rights under that subdivision were not exclusive of his right to avoid 
the mortgage in toto pursuant to § 70e. Accord, Campbell v. Dalbey, 23 F.2d 229 (5th 
Cir. 1928). Although both these rulings antedated Moore v. Bay, the court's opinions 
seem to have anticipated it by assuming an unlimited right of recovery under § 70e. 
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priority as well as of avoidance against the holder of a security in-
terest that could have been asserted by a creditor who obtained a lien 
by judicial proceedings on the date of bankruptcy against the prop-
erty subject to such security interest. 
5. If a security interest may be avoided only by a creditor who 
had extended credit at some critical juncture and who had obtained 
a lien by judicial proceedings against the property subject to the 
security interest in question, the trustee may avoid the security inter-
est only if there is an actual creditor with a provable claim against 
the estate who extended credit at the critical time before bankruptcy, 
but he need not have acquired a lien by judicial proceedings. 
6. If the trustee's avoidance of a security interest pursuant to 
section 60, 67a, 67c(l), or 67d would redound to the benefit of the 
holder of a junior security interest otherwise indefeasible by the 
trustee or to any person or persons other than the general creditors, 
the trustee may obtain an order preserving the voidable security in-
terest for the benefit of the estate. 
7. When a security interest is preserved for the benefit of the 
estate under section 60b, 67a, 67c(2), or 67d, the trustee is limited 
in his recovery to the amount of the claim of the creditor whose 
security interest is preserved. 
8. When a security interest is preserved for the benefit of the 
estate under section 70e, the amount of the secured creditor's claim 
is no more a limit on the trustee's recovery than it is in a case when 
the trustee seeks and obtains avoidance under that subdivision. 
9. If a secured creditor of the estate has priority over another 
secured creditor in the collateral subject to their security interests, 
the trustee is not entitled to assert the right of priority of the one 
against the other if the prior interest is not voidable and thus not 
preservable for the benefit of the estate. 
10. If a secured creditor with a provable claim against the estate 
has a right to avoid the security interest of another independently of 
any claim of priority dependent on his security, the trustee may assert 
the right of avoidance, subject to the secured creditor's right to en-
force his security interest if indefeasible by the trustee. 
11. A lien creditor's right against an unperfected security in-
terest under section 9-301 of the Code is a right of priority which the 
trustee is not entitled to assert under section 70e. 
12. The priority of a lien obtained by judicial proceedings over 
a security interest (as provided by section 9-301(1)(b) of the Code) 
may be preserved for the benefit of the estate if the lien so obtained 
thereafter becomes voidable under section 67a of the Bankruptcy Act. 
